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KELLY CRITERION FOR VARIABLE PAY-OFF
RICARDO PE´REZ MARCO
Abstract. We determine Kelly criterion for a game with variable pay-off. The
Kelly fraction satisfies a fundamental integral equation and is smaller than the
classical Kelly fraction for the same game with the constant average pay-off.
1. Introduction.
Kelly criterion (see [3]), also called ”‘Fortune Formula”’, is the fundamental tool to
ensure an optimal positive return when playing with repetition a favorable game or
strategy. It was first proposed by Edward Thorp for the money management of his
card counting strategy to beat casino blackjack (see [6]). Later he applied the same
ideas to the financial markets (see [2]), and L. Breinman (see [1]) proved that it was
the optimal strategy for long run accumulation of capital.
One needs to modify the theory for common situation where the advantage is
not known exactly but is a random variable (see [4]). In this ”‘fuzzy advantage”’
situation one needs to be far more conservative (see section 3 in [4]). When we apply
Kelly criterion to decision making in real situations, we are confronted with a fuzzy
advantage but also a variable reward or pay-off. In this article we study how to modify
Kelly criterion when the pay-off is a random variable with a known distribution. We
obtain the same type of conclusion than in [4]: The optimal Kelly fraction is more
conservative than the one in the same game with the constant average pay-off.
2. The classical Kelly criterion.
We assume that we are playing a game with repetition. At each round we risk a
fraction 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 of our capital X . With probability 0 < p < 1 we win and the
pay-off is b-to-1, with b ≥ 0. This means that if X is our current capital, if we lose
the bet (which happens with probability q = 1− p) we substract fX to our capital,
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and if we win, we add bfX to our capital . Thus, the expected gain is
E(∆X) = pbfX − qfX = (pb− q)fX = (p(1 + b)− 1)fX .
If we play a game with advantage, that is p(1+ b) > 1, then we expect an exponential
growth of our initial bankroll X0 if we follow a reasonable betting strategy. We
assume that there is no minimal unit of bet. By homogeneity of the problem, a
sharp strategy must consist in betting a proportion f(p) of the total bankroll. In the
classical Kelly criterion, p and b are assumed to be constant at each round. In this
article we assume that p is constant but the pay-off b is a random variable. We first
review the classical Kelly criterion with a constant pay-off that finds f(p) in order
to maximize the expected exponential growth. Our bankroll after having played n
rounds of the game have is
Xn = X0
n∏
i=1
(1 + bif(p))
where bi = b if we won the i-th round, and ǫi = −1 if we lost the i-th round. The
exponential rate of growth of the bankroll is
Gn =
1
n
log
Xn
X0
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
log(1 + bif(p)).
The Kelly criterion maximizes the expected value of the exponential rate of growth:
Theorem 2.1. (Kelly criterion) For a game with advantage, that is p(b+1) > 1,
the expected value of the exponential rate of growth Gn is maximized for
f ∗(p, b) = p− q/b =
p(1 + b)− 1
b
.
The argument is straightforward. Observe that the expected value is
E(Gn) = E(G1) = p log(1 + bf) + (1− p) log(1− f) = g(f).
This function of the variable f has a derivative,
g′(f) =
pb
1 + bf
−
1− p
1− f
=
(p(1 + b)− 1)− fb
(1 + fb)(1− f)
,
and g(f) → 0 when f → 0+, and g(f) → −∞ when f → 1−. Also g′(f) > 0 near
0, and g′ is decreasing, so g is concave. Thus g(f) increases from 0 to its maximum
attained at
f ∗ = f ∗(p, b) =
p(1 + b)− 1
b
and then decreases to −∞.
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3. Kelly criterion with variable pay-off.
This situation arises in a number of practical situations. The original problem that
motivated the use of Kelly criterion was casino blackjack where the pay-off is constant
b = 1. But in other card games, like poker cash, the pay-off is variable. Also some
trading strategies cannot set a predetermined pay-off, for example when speculating
with a price rebound in a volatile market. The historic of trades of traders present a
certain distribution of pay-offs for the successful trades. Therefore in these situations
we cannot consider b constant. We assume that the pay-off b is a random variable with
a known non-negative distribution ρ : R+ → R+, with ρ(x)dx giving the probability
that the pay-off is in the infinitesimal interval [x, x+ dx]. In practice ρ has compact
support and can be obtained empirically, although the model in [5] shows that the
tail is of Pareto type. We do not need to assume that the distribution is absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure (same proofs).
We can use a similar argument as in the previous section in order to determine the
sharp fraction to bet fˆ .
To determine when the game is favorable we compute
E(X1 −X0) = (1− p)fX0 + pfX0
∫
+∞
0
b ρ(b) db ,
Thus the condition for a favorable game is
(1) p
(
1 +
∫
+∞
0
b ρ(b) db
)
> 1 ,
which (naturally) is the same condition than that of a constant pay-off game where
the pay-off is the average pay-off:
p(1 + b¯) > 1 ,
and
b¯ =
∫
+∞
0
b ρ(b) db.
After n rounds, if bi is the pay-off in the i-th round, the expected exponential
growth is
g(f) = E(Gn) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
E(log(1 + bif))
= q log(1− f) + p
∫
+∞
0
log(1 + bf) ρ(b) db ,
under the integrable assumption that the density of the pay-off function makes the
integral finite.
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Again g(f)→ 0 when f → 0+, g(f)→ −∞ when f → 1−, and
g′(f) = −
q
1− f
+ p
∫
+∞
0
bρ(b)
1 + bf
db .
We observe that when f → 0+,
g′(f) ≈ −(1− p) + p
∫
+∞
0
b ρ(b) db
thus g′(f) > 0 by the favorable game condition (1). Moreover g′ is strictly decreasing,
so g is strictly concave, and tends to −∞ when f → 1−. Thus there is exactly one
value fˆ = fˆ(p) that maximizes this expression and annihilates g′. It is the unique
solution fˆ(p, ρ) to the fundamental integral equation
(2) p
∫
+∞
0
b ρ(b)
1 + bfˆ
db−
1− p
1− fˆ
= 0 .
Theorem 3.1. (Kelly criterion for variable pay-off) A game with variable
pay-off with a distribution ρ is favorable if
p
(
1 +
∫
+∞
0
b ρ(b) db
)
> 1 .
The expected value of the exponential rate of growth is maximized for 0 < fˆ =
fˆ(p, ρ) < 1 satisfying the fundamental integral equation
p
∫
+∞
0
b ρ(b)
1 + bfˆ
db−
1− p
1− fˆ
= 0 .
Corollary 3.2. The optimal Kelly fraction fˆ(p, ρ) for a favorable game with variable
pay-off is smaller than the optimal Kelly fraction f ∗(p, b¯) for the same game with
constant pay-off equal to the average pay-off b¯,
b¯ =
∫
+∞
0
b ρ(b) db .
We have
fˆ(p, ρ) ≤ f ∗(p, b¯) .
We only have equality when the pay-off is constant.
Proof. The function of b,
h(b) =
b
1 + bfˆ
,
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is strictly concave and therefore, by Jensen’s inequality, we have∫
+∞
0
b ρ(b)
1 + bfˆ
db ≤
b¯
1 + b¯f
.
So, using the fundamental equation (2)we get
p
b¯
1 + b¯f
−
1− p
1− fˆ
= −
1− p
1− f ∗
−
1− p
1− fˆ
≥ 0 ,
and the result follows. The case of equality follows from the case of equality of
Jensen’s inequality and only occurs for a Dirac distribution. 
Conclusion:
In a situation when the pay-off is variable one needs to adjust the Kelly fraction in
a conservative way.
Remark.
The analysis generalizes to situations where the risk is larger than the fraction
waged. As noted by Thorp, this happens in a leveraged investment in the financial
markets.
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